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RACE, REDISTRICTING AND A REPUBLICAN
POLL TAX: THE SUPREME COURT'S VOTING
RIGHTS DECISIONS OF THE 1995-96 TERM
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
Now, we will deal with the question of affirmative action and
the racial problems of the country; more specifically, the question
of racially oriented legislative districts. We are honored to have
one of the prime authorities on this subject, Professor Frank
Parker. Professor Parker is a visiting professor at Washington
and Lee University School of Law in Lexington, Virginia. He
has written extensively in the area of civil rights. He is the
recipient of numerous awards including: the American Bar
Association Silver Gavel Award, the American Political Science
Association, the Ralph J. Bunche Award, and the Southern
Political Science Association award. Prior to becoming a law
professor, Professor Parker was Director of the Voting Rights
Project of the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
from 1981 to 1993, where he litigated numerous voting rights
cases, including the Mississippi Congressional redistricting cases
and Mississippi and Virginia's legislative redistricting cases. In
addition, he was active in civil rights litigation, particularly in
Mississippi, over a period of twelve years. We are particularly
honored to have Professor Frank Parker as a speaker.
Professor Frank Parker:
Thank you very much, Judge Lazer. It is a pleasure for me to
come before you from the mountains of western Virginia, not
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I am coming to talk to you today about the voting rights cases
of the Supreme Court which have become a major part of the
Supreme Court's docket. The decisions last term in Shaw v.
Hunt I. which was Shaw v. Reno, 2 round two, Bush v. Vera3 and
Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia4 are three decisions which
encompass 156 pages. A commentary on these three Court
1. 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996). The Court reheard a case that it remanded to
the district court in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). Id. at 1899. The
issue presented in both cases was whether North Carolina's reapportionment
scheme was "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest" so that it
would not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution. Id. The reapportionment plan, which included two majority-
black districts, was adopted following the 1990 census, when North Carolina
was allocated an additional seat in Congress. Id. The district court held that
although the lines were drawn with the intention of drawing districts with
certain racial compositions, the scheme was constitutional because it was
"narrowly tailored to further the State's compelling interests in complying
with ... the Voting Rights Act." Id. at 1899-1900. The Court held that the
North Carolina reapportionment scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause
because it was not narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. 116
S. Ct. at 1899. The district did not contain a "geographically compact"
population of any race. Id. at 1905.
2. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). See supra text accompanying note 1.
3. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996). Following the 1990 census, the Texas
Legislature redistricted by creating a new majority-African-American district,
a new maiority-Hispanic district, and reconfigured a district to make it a
maiority-African American district. Id. at 1950-51. The Court held that the
district lines at issue "[we]re not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest." Id. at 1951. It was feasible for the districts to retain their majority-
minority status by making them more compact and less bizarrely shaped. Id.
at 1961.
4. 116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996). Registered voters wishing to declare their
support for the Republican Party's nominees were permitted to participate in
the nominating process for the election of the United States Senator upon
paying a registration fee. Id. at 1191. In 1993, the Republican Party of
Virginia called for a state convention to nominate the Republican candidate for
the office of United States Senator. Id. All registered voters in Virginia could
participate in local mass meetings, canvasses or conventions. Id. Only those
voters who paid the registration fee could be certified as a delegate to the state
convention. Id. The Court held that the Republican party had been "acting
under authority explicitly or implicitly granted by a covered jurisdiction," and
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decisions could have been a major book review, rather than a
summary of Supreme Court cases. There are thirteen opinions in
these 156 pages. What does that tell us? One, it means that
Justice Stevens has, for as long as he has been on the Court, not
learned how to write short opinions. And two, it shows that the
Court is still very heavily divided in this area.
We see the Court's divisions by listing the opinions in Bush.
Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion in which she rendered the
judgment of the court, joined by Justices Rehnquist and
Kennedy. 5 Then Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurring
opinion. 6  Therefore, in Bush, it is puzzling why Justice
O'Connor required a second opinion. Justice Kennedy wrote a
second concurring opinion with Justices Thomas and Scalia, and
that is just the majority. 7 Justice Stevens dissented, joined, by
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. In addition, Justice Souter
dissented, also joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. We still
have a heavily fractionated court in this area of the law, which is
still somewhat unsettling.
Let me give you a brief background on the voting rights cases
as they have come to the Supreme Court and the legal context of
current decisions. In 1980, the Supreme Court decided City of
Mobile v. Bolden. 8 The Court held that in voting rights cases
brought by minorities, the plaintiffs had to prove discriminatory
5. Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1950.
6. Id. at 1968.
7. Id. at 1971-72.
8. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Mobile, Alabama was governed by a three-
member City Commission that was elected by voters throughout the city. Id.
at 58. A class action suit was brought alleging that this practice "unfairly
diluted the voting strength of Negroes in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, of the Fourteenth Amendment, and of the Fifteenth
Amendment." Id. The Court concluded that § 2 was not meant to have an
effect that was in opposition to that of the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 61.
The Court held that plaintiff's Fifteenth Amendment rights were not violated
because "their freedom to vote ha[d] not been denied or abridged by anyone."
Id. at 65. The Court also held that their Fourteenth Amendment Rights were
not violated because it was insufficient to show primarily "that the group
allegedly discriminated against has not elected representatives in proportion to
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purpose to mount a successful Fourteenth Amendment challenge
to a voting practice or particular redistricting plan. 9 Much of the
voting rights litigation that had been in progress up to that date
was brought to a complete halt. Bolden was viewed by minority
plaintiffs as an insurmountable obstacle to minority voting rights
litigation.
In 1982 Congress amended the Voting Rights Act. 10 Congress
eliminated the requirement of proving discriminatory intent to
establish a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and
substituted a results test. The results test required that in any
voting practice, plaintiffs must prove that there was a
discriminatory result. The discriminatory result could thus be
challenged under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
9. Id. (holding that the plan must have been "conceived or operated as [a]
purposeful devic[e] to further racial . . . discrimination").
10. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1973 (1973). Section 1973 states:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based
on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political
process leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that
its members have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice . The extent to which members of a
protected class have been elected to office in the State or political
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered:
Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their
proportion in the population.
Id.
Matthew M. Hoffman, The Illegitimate President Minority Vote Dilution
and the Electoral College, 105 YALE L.J. 5, 1963-64 (1996). The 1982
amendments to § 2 came in response to the decision in Mobile. Id. Congress
"add[ed] § 2(b) and the "results" language of § 2(a), creating a generally
statutory basis for vote-dilution claims." Id.
440 [Vol 13
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In 1986, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Thornburgh v. Ginglesll and further simplified the proof
required in voting rights litigation to three basic elements. 12 The
Court in Gingles held that in order to prevail, a plaintiff
claiming to be a minority group must prove: 1) that the minority
group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in a single member district and that a
majority member or single member district could be drawn; 2)
that the minority group is politically cohesive, and the minority
group "bloc voted" on a regular basis; and 3) that the white
majority votes in a block which would enable it to usually defeat
the minority's preferred candidate. 13 It did not take long for
state legislatures and local governments to recognize these
elements. If the three elements are deconstructed, they can be
translated into an "if then" statement. If elements two and three
are present, that is, if you could show that minority voters, "bloc
voted" for minority candidates, and if you can show that white
voters regularly "bloc voted" to defeat minority candidates, then
the failure to create a majority-minority district14 where one
could be created, could be a violation of Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act.
After the 1990 census, a number of state legislatures and local
governmental bodies adopted an unprecedented number of
11. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). The North Carolina General Assembly enacted a
redistricting plan for the State's Senate and House of Representatives. Id. at
34-35. The action was brought by black plaintiffs in order to challenge one
single-member and six multimember districts. Id. at 35. The plaintiffs
alleged that the redistricting plan violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments because it prevented black citizens from electing their chosen
representatives. Id.
12. Id. at 50-51.
13. Bloc voting occurs when a majority votes in a cohesive unit, thereby
enabling it to defeat a minority candidate, unless the minority candidate is
unopposed. Id. at 51. The majority bloc could usually succeed in defeating
candidates advanced by a "politically unified, cohesive, geographically insular
minority group." Id. at 49.
14. Voinovich v Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 149 (1993) (stating that a
majority-minority district is one wherein a majority of the population belongs
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majority-minority districts. The number of majority black and
majority Hispanic Congressional Districts doubled from twenty-
six to fifty-two. The creation of these districts resulted not only
from the mandate of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, but also
from pressure from the Justice Department, which required
preclearance pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 15
Local jurisdictions were basically informed that if they did not
create additional majority-minority districts, where the creation
of those districts was possible, the Justice Department would not
approve their plans. It is also possible that many jurisdictions
affected by the Voting Rights Act simply adopted additional
majority-minority districts to achieve racial fairness, because
minorities did not have representation. This increase in the
number of majority-minority districts after the 1990 census,
particularly at the Congressional level, led to substantial increases
in minority representation in Congress.
Beginning in 1993, the Supreme Court began to adopt
standards and principles that would limit the development of
majority-minority districts. The Supreme Court in Shaw,
confronted two highly irregular majority-black congressional
districts in North Carolina and sustained a new Equal Protection
cause of action. 16  The Court held that if a state adopted a
majority-minority district that was highly irregular in shape, the
adoption of such a district would be considered as an effort to
separate the voters on the basis of race, which would constitute
an Equal Protection violation. 17 The Court did not strike down
15. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 529 (1973) (holding that state
legislatures in states covered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C
§1973c (1994), are required to obtain preclearance of new redistricting plans).
See also, Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1193. Preclearance is required when a political
party effects a change regarding voting. Id. Two conditions must be satisfied:
1) the change must relate to a public electoral function of the political party
and 2) the political party must be acting pursuant to the implicit or explicit
authority granted by a covered jurisdiction. Id.
16. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 658. The Court concluded that a plaintiff may
allege that the ostensibly race-neutral statue is actually an effort to racially
separate voters into different districts, and that such separation is unjustified.
Id. at 649.
17. Id. at 658.
442 [Vol 13
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these districts; rather, it remanded the case to the North Carolina
District Court. The North Carolina District Court in Shv v.
Reno held that this Equal Protection violation was not
established.
In Miller v. Johnson1 8 in 1995, the Court was faced with the
1th Congressional District in Georgia, which was also highly
irregular in shape. The Court held that this district was drawn as
a majority-minority district. 19 As such, it was subject to strict
scrutiny20 if the State Legislature adopted districts in which race
was the predominant factor in the delineation of the district. The
Court thus moved from a standard of looking at the shape of the
districts, in which a highly irregular shaped district would trigger
strict scrutiny, to another stronger and more pervasive standard.
If race were the predominant factor in the drawing of district
lines, then strict scrutiny would be triggered and the burden
would shift to the state to show that these districts were narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. This strict
scrutiny standard is a very demanding standard indeed.
Professor Gunther has written that strict scrutiny is "strict in
theory, fatal in fact." 2 1  Justice O'Connor, in the Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena22 decision, denied that strict scrutiny
18. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). Georgia residents challenged the
constitutionality of Georgia's congressional redistricting plan. Id. at 2482.
19. Id. at 2488-89.
20. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (citing the proposition
that "the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications ... be
subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny'"). See also, Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2475.
"Laws classifying citizens on the basis of race cannot be upheld unless they are
narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling state interest." Id. at 2482.
"[Riedistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face that it is unexplainable
on grounds other than race ... demands the same close scrutiny that we give
other state laws that classify citizens by race." Id. at 2483 (quoting Shaw v.
Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2825 (1993)).
21. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
22. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). Plaintiff, a construction company, submitted
the lowest bid to serve as subcontractor to supply guardrails to a federal
highway project. Id. at 2102. The bid was denied in favor of a construction
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is "strict in theory, fatal in fact.",23 But we have yet to see an
instance in which the Supreme Court has sustained any of these
newly created majority-minority districts. And indeed, in the
two cases under examination today, the Supreme Court struck
them down.
Shaw v. Hunt was Shaw v. Reno upon its return to the United
States Supreme Court. The district court, on remand in Shaw,
sustained the constitutionality of the majority black Congressional
Districts in North Carolina and sustained the evidence that the
plaintiffs presented. 24 The 12th Congressional District of North
Carolina started in the Raleigh-Durham area proceeded down a
narrow band along 1-85 to Charlotte and continued on to
Gastonia. 2 5 One of the commentators remarked that if you drove
down 1-85 with the doors open, you were liable to kill half the
people in the district. 26 This was intended as a joke, but the
United States Supreme Court took it very seriously as a
commentary on the narrow shape of the district.
The district court examined the state's purpose in creating the
new districts. First of all, the North Carolina legislature had a
rational purpose in adopting two Congressional Districts in this
area. both of which were majority black. 27 One purpose was to
adopt a district which was predominantly rural. 2 8 Accordingly,
the 1st congressional district was established in the rural area
north of the 12th district. 29  The second goal was to adopt
individuals." Id. The general contractor received additional compensation
from the government for accepting bids from construction companies that fit
into this category. Id. The Court concluded that when a party receives
unequal treatment from the government because of their race, an injury has
occurred that "falls squarely within the language and spirit of the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection." Id. at 2114.
23. Id. at 2117.
24. See supra text accompanying note 1.
25. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 417 (E.D.N.C. 1994), rev'd, 116 S.
Ct. 1894 (1996).
26. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 636 (quoting Joan Biskupic, A Case to Pose Test of
Racial Redistricting, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1993, at A4).
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another district that was predominantly urban.30 There is a string
of cities and towns along 1-85, all of which qualified as big cities
with populations over 20,000 which satisfied the requirement of
adopting an urban district. 3 1 This district was designated as the
Piedmont Crescent District or the Central Piedmont Urban
Corridor. 32 The plaintiffs thus succeeded at the district court
level in justifying the formation of the two districts on the basis
of non-racial factors.
The third goal was to preserve incumbents in office. This was
also a non-racial criterion. The district court, however, despite
the presence of non-racial criteria, ruled that race had been a
predominant factor in the drawing of these district lines. 33
Nevertheless, the court held that the districts were justified in
attempting to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,
the results tests which Congress had adopted in 1982, and the
Thornburg v. Gingles standards 34 and Section 535 of the Voting
Rights Act.3 6 When a jurisdiction is covered by Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, it has to submit its voting law changes,
including new redistricting plans, to the Justice Department in
Washington. 37 If the Justice Department objects to these plans,
30. Id.
3 I. Id. at 468. These cities included Gastonia and Winston-Salem. Id.
32. Id. at 468.
33. Id. at 431. The Court looked to the "race-as-a-motivating-factor"
triggering test. Id. This test helped demonstrate that the redistricting plan
deliberately created another district wherein a particular racial group was a
majority, even though the precise delineation and location of the district may
have been motivated by non-racial factors. Id.
34. Id. at 438.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1994). Section 1973b states in pertinent part:
(2) To assist the court in determining whether to issue a
declaratory judgment under this subsection, the plaintiff shall present
evidence of minority participation, including evidence of the levels of
minority group registration and voting, changes in such levels over
time, and disparities between minority-group and non-minority group
participation.
Id.
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then the plans cannot be implemented. 3 8 Indeed, the Justice
Department had objected to North Carolina's first plan, which
only had one majority black district. 39 In order to comply with
the Justice Department's objection, North Carolina had to adopt a
second majority black district. 40 The district court in this case
ruled that this was sufficient justification for drawing two
majority black districts. 4 1
The facts in Bush are a little more complicated. Even in the
majority opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote that this was a mixed
motive case. 4 2 If you look at the map of Texas Congressional
District 30 in the Dallas area, you would immediately think that
it looks like a Rorschach or a psychiatric ink blot test. However,
if you know the facts of this case, the shape of these district lines
can be perfectly logical. The black population of Dallas lives in
an area in the southeast section of Dallas. The area just to the
north of that is called the Park Cities area. It is called Park
Cities because it is a series of cities all of which have "Park" in
their last name, like Highland Park. This is a predominantly
white. Republican area. The people living in the Parks Cities
area did not want to be in the same Congressional District with
the black population of southeast Dallas. Nor did the black
population of southeast Dallas necessarily want the white
Republicans of Park Cities to be in their districts, accordingly
they concluded an agreement. The boundary lines of this
Congressional District would thus circumvent the Park Cities
area. This was acceptable to everyone, including the white,
incumbent member of Congress from the Park Cities area.
38. Id. at 442. The Justice Department has been authorized by Congress
"to serve as a surrogate for the District Court in reviewing § 5 submissions."
Id.
39. Id. at 464. The Justice Department stated that "two majority-minority
congressional districts . . . could be drawn in North Carolina, and that . . .
failure to do so constituted an impermissible dilution of minority voting
strength." Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 474.
42. 116 S. Ct. at 1948. Therefore, "a careful review [was] . . . necessary
to determine whether the districts at issue [werel subject to [strict] scrutiny."
[Vol 13446
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The residents of Southeast Dallas and Park Cities now had a
problem because their proposal failed to include the required
population; there must be a prescribed number of people in the
Congressional District to satisfy the "one person, one vote"4 3
requirement. If Park Cities were bypassed, the district would fail
to reach the required population level. The only way to satisfy
the population requirement would be to expand east and north.
There were certain groups in this area which did not want to be
included in the district. The district actually extended into the
next county and included a racially mixed neighborhood. With
regard to this tentacle on the north, part of the district was not
even majority black. It was only twenty to thirty percent black.
The district was drawn in such a way as to protect the incumbent
members of Congress, and preserve their re-election
opportunities. On both the east side and the west side, the same
conditions applied. There were two white Democrats in
Congress from this area, Martin Frost and John Bryant. Both
Frost and Bryant did not want the district lines to take too many
loyal Democrats from their areas because they were concerned
about their chances of re-election. These Democratic areas were
basically sliced up and deals were made, almost on a block by
block basis. The negotiations resolved which portions would be
included in the 30th District and which portions were to be
included in the other district. The solution was to create a
majority-minority district, a majority black district. Eddie
Bernice Johnson,44 the Chair of the Senate District Committee
that was responsible for drawing the district lines, ran and was
elected to Congress from this district in the 1992 elections.
This ostensibly self-serving practice of drawing Congressional
District lines and then running for and getting elected to Congress
43. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (noting that the Equal
Protection Clause guarantees equality to all citizens, in order to preserve their
right to one person, one vote).
44. Texas State Senator Eddie Bernice Johnson sat on the Senate
Committee of the Whole on Redistricting and chaired the Subcommittee on
Congressional Districts. 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1313 (1994). "It was widely
acknowledged that then-Senator Johnson had enormous authority in drawing
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was simply a long-standing Texas tradition. Whenever Texas got
additional Congressional Districts, the State Legislator would
simply say, "that is my district." The legislators' wishes were
thus observed. They drew the district lines, they would run, and
they would be elected. That was simply politics as usual in
Texas. I am certain that this has occurred in other states as well.
In this instance, the three judge district court was very hostile
to the three districts. There was one majority black district in
Dallas and one majority black district in Houston. There was
also a majority Hispanic district in Houston, which did not elect a
Hispanic member of Congress in the 1992 election. The district
court was very hostile to those districts and struck them down as
being drawn primarily according to racial classifications.
Both of these two cases came to the Supreme Court. The
North Carolina irregularly shaped district had been sustained by
the district court, while the Texas districts were struck down by
the district court.
In both of these cases the Supreme Court invalidated the
districts, stating that they failed to meet Equal Protection
standards. The vote was five to four, which suggests a heavily
fragmented court. 45 The Court reasoned that race was the
predominant factor in drawing these district lines. Therefore, the
districts in both of these states were subject to strict scrutiny. The
states, in both instances, failed to demonstrate that the districts
were narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling governmental
interest.
The states argued that their first interest was to remedy past
discrimination. 46 The Court held that this interest was not
specific enough. 47 The states had to identify the discrimination
45. Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1898 (delivering the majority opinion were Chief
Justice Rehnquist , joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas; Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer and Souter dissented); Vera, 116
S. Ct. at 1950 (holding for the majority: Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist,
Kennedy, Thomas and Scalia; Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer and Souter
dissented).
46. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1960; Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1902.
47. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1963; Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1903.
448 [Vol 13
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and show how the district was narrowly tailored to remedy it.48
The second compelling state interest was compliance with
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.49 The states argued that the
Justice Department made them create the districts.50 The Court
held that this justification was insufficient to satisfy the
compelling state interest standard. 5 1 Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, as the Court had held in prior decisions, only protect
against retrogression or actions by the state voting law changes
that diminish existing levels of minority voting strength. 52 The
Court stated that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act had never
been interpreted to require augmentation of minority voting
strength. 53  Its purpose was to protect against diminishing
minority voting strength. 54 As a result, the Court held that
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act did not require the creation of
additional majority-black and majority-Hispanic districts.55
Additionally, the state argued these districts were justified to
comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act under the
Thornburg standards. 5 6 The Court pointed out that this was not
accurate. 57 The first factor in establishing a Section 2 violation
under Thornburg was the requirement that a plaintiff had to prove
that the minority group was sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single member district. 58
48. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1963; Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1902.
49. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1960; Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1902.
50. Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1903.
51. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1960; Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1903.
52. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1963; Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1904. See Miller v.
U.S.. 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2492 (1995) (invalidating a Georgia congressional
redistricting plan on Equal Protection grounds where race was found to be the
primary motivating factor in setting district boundaries); Beer v. U.S.. 425
U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (upholding a New Orleans city council redistricting plan
which provided for the first two majority-black districts, only one of which
contained a black voting majority).
53. Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1904.
54. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1963 (citing Miller. 115 S. Ct. at 2493).
55. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1963; Shaw. 116 S. Ct. at 1903 (citing Miller,
115 S. Ct. at 2491).
56. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1960; Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1902.
57. Vera, 116S. Ct. at 1961; Shaw at 1906.
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The minority groups were not sufficiently compact in either of
these instances. 5 9 The groups were spread out and the districts
were highly irregular and uncompact in their shape. 60 Therefore,
the creation of these districts was not required to remedy a
violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 6 1 Thus, in both
cases the Supreme Court failed to find any compelling state
interest or any state interest at all that would justify sustaining
the districts.
All of the cases are consistent, from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v.
Vera. The Supreme Court struck down increases in minority
representation in Congress from majority-black and majority-
Hispanic districts. Nevertheless, there are several problems with
these cases. One problem is that the decisions fail to fit within
the traditional parameters provided for Equal Protection
violations. None of the plaintiffs in these cases, all of them
white, claim that they were denied either the right to vote or that
their voting strength in any way was diluted. In both cases, white
voters had proportional representation or better on a statewide
basis. The cases thus lacked the critical elements of an Equal
Protection violation. There were no allegations of discriminatory
intent or discriminatory purpose. There is no proof of any
discriminatory effect. Certainly, some whites who had previously
been in white-majority districts were placed in majority-black or
Hispanic districts. But the Supreme Court has never held that the
mere placement in such a district, in and of itself, was sufficient
to establish a Constitutional injury. If that were true, there could
never be a redistricting plan that would pass Constitutional
muster. In every redistricting plan ever drawn, there are whites in
majority-minority districts and minorities in majority-white
districts. That cannot possibly be a Constitutional violation.
In addition, these cases fail to satisfy traditional Equal
Protection analysis because they depart substantially from what is
termed the political process theory in Equal Protection analysis.
59. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1961; Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1906.
60. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1961; Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1899 (citing Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 635-36 (1993)).
61. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1961; Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1906.
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Commentators have said that the primary function of the Equal
Protection Clause should be to protect traditionally
disadvantaged, disempowered and disenfranchised minorities
from the will of the majority. 62 Minorities should be protected,
especially in instances where they are subjected to discrimination
or where there has been an unequal distribution of benefits and
burdens. These have been the criteria by which the Supreme
Court has identified protected classes under the Equal Protection
Clause. These criteria do not apply in the aforementioned cases,
because the plaintiffs were all white voters. Additionally, all of
the plans were passed by majority-white legislatures, so there was
no instance of a disenfranchised or historically disempowered
minority needing the protection of the court from the majority.
I would like to suggest that there is another way of looking at
Shaw and Bush that makes much more sense. Shaw and Bush are
actually substantive due process cases, 63 as distinct from the
Equal Protection analysis to which the Court subjected the above
cases. These cases are really much closer, for example. to
Lochner v. New York64 than they are to Gonzillion v. Lightfoot.65
62. See Jacobus ten Broek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States - Consummation to Abolition and Kev to the Fourteenth
Amendment, 39 CAL. L. REV. 171, 200-01 (1951), JOHN HART ELY.
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 30-
31 (1980); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(2nd ed. 1988).
63. Paul G. Kauper, Penumbras and Peripheries. 64 MIcH. L. REIy. 235
(1965). "Substantive due process" refers to an interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment which holds that certain fundamental rights are protected from
arbitrary governmental infringement. Id. at 236. Utilizing this theory. the
Court has invalidated governmental restrictions which unreasonably interfered
with rights not protected explicitly in the first eight amendments, as well as
some of the rights protected therein. Id. at 239.
64. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The challenged statute
prohibited an employer from requiring or permitting a bakery employee to
work in excess of sixty hours per week, or in excess of ten hours per day on
average for the week. Id. at 46 n. 1.
65. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). An Alabama law
redefined the City of Tuskegee boundaries. changing its shape "from a square
to an uncouth twenty-eight sided figure." in an attempt to disenfranchise
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The Court is really saying that the state lacks the power to create
majority-minority districts. That certainly is one element of
substantive due process. In Lochner, the plaintiffs challenged the
New York statute which regulated the working hours of bakers.
The statute provided that the bakers could work no more than ten
hours a day and not more than six days a week. This was
intended to be protective legislation. The Supreme Court struck
down the statute. The Court reasoned that the state legislature
had no legitimate governmental purpose in regulating labor
conditions; moreover, the statute was an improper exercise of
the state's police power. 66 The Court further held that the state
regulation was an arbitrary and unnecessary interference with an
employer's Fourteenth Amendment right to limit their
employees' work. 67
The same analysis arguably can be applied to both Shaw and
Bush. First, the Supreme Court is saying that the states have
neither a legitimate purpose, nor authority under Sections 5 or 2
of the Voting Rights Act to create these majority-black and
Hispanic districts. Second, the creation of majority-minority
districts was an arbitrary and unreasonable interference with the
liberty of white voters to live in a white-majority district. The
above interpretation of Shaw and Bush is implicitly supported by
a doctrine that the Supreme Court has invented in these decisions,
entitled the Doctrine of Representational Harm. 68 In the first
Representational Harm case. the court in Shaw held that when a
discriminatory, its impact was racially disproportionate: it removed "all but 4
or 5 of its Negro voters while not removing a single white voter or resident."
Id. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court's dismissal of the
complaint, affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, holding that the Fifteenth
Amendment prohibited the Legislature from causing a deprivation of voting
rights on the basis of race. Id. at 346.
66. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61.
67. Id. at 64.
68. Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1911 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The doctrine of
representational harm states that "race-based districting may cause
officeholders to represent only those of the majority race in their district ...
(rendering them] unlikely to provide effective representation to those voters
whose interest are not aligned with those of the majority race in their district."
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district is created solely to effectuate the perceived common
interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to
believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the
members of that group, rather than their constituency as a
whole. 69
The Court is arguably reasoning that if the State Legislature
creates a majority black district or Hispanic district, and a black
or Hispanic representative is elected, those representatives are
more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent
the black voters or the Hispanic voters of a particular district,
rather than the white voters of the district. This is the first time
that the Court has ever said this. In all of the prior vote dilution
cases, including the political gerrymandering cases, Davis v.
Bandemer7o and others, the Court has uniformly held that it
cannot be presumed that any elected representative will only
represent the majority voters of his or her district. The court will
presume that the elected representatives will represent everyone
equally in the district. It is up to the plaintiffs to prove that the
69. Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 646.
70. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). Claiming that Democratic
votes were unconstitutionally diluted, appellees challenged a 1981 Indiana state
legislative reapportionment plan on equal protection grounds. Id. at 113.
Specifically, they alleged that the results of the 1982 elections demonstrated a
disparate impact on Democratic voting power. Id. Although Democrats
received a majority of the statewide vote in Indiana House of Representatives
elections, they won merely forty-three per cent of the races, and fared only
marginally better in State Senate races. Id. at 115. The Court found that
resolution of the issue was not precluded by the political question doctrine, but
resolvable by the courts on equal protection grounds. Id. at 124. In upholding
the plan, the Court held that the results of one election were insufficient
"evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters .... ."
Id. at 133. See also United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144. 166
(noting that a 1974 race-conscious redistricting plan for Brooklyn did not
violate the Equal Protection rights of whites residing in new minority-majority
districts because they would receive adequate representation from legislators
elected in the remaining majority white districts); Whitcomb v. Chavis. 403
U.S. 124. 158-59 (finding that multimember districting is not inherently
discriminatory because the Fourteenth Amendment only requires access to the
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representatives are not providing adequate representation to the
minority.
The Supreme Court has reversed the presumption and is now
presuming, in the case of majority-minority districts, that the
elected representative will only represent voters of the same race.
The Court's decision seems to suggest the existence of a new
substantive due process liberty of white voters to live in a white-
majority district. As in Lochner, I believe this standard makes the
action of the State Legislatures in creating Constitutional
majority-minority districts very often dependent upon the
individual views of the justices who might be in the majority. It
is submitted that this is basically what happened here and in this
line of cases. In Lochner, Justice Holmes, in his dissent, said the
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact. 7 1  Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics,72 upon which the Lochner case was based, and
which, was a particular economic theory in Herbert Spencer's
work. With regard to the theory, there was no particular
consensus. It was simply a particular viewpoint. I think the same
thing is true in these cases. We might say that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Abigail Thernstrom's Whose Votes
Count?73
What is the essence of these cases? Do these cases completely
outlaw majority-minority districts or can majority-minority
districts still be drawn and still meet Constitutional requirements?
First, legislatures can still draw multimember districts if equal
weight is given to non-racial neutral criteria. Arguably, in these
cases, such districts are not even subject to strict scrutiny. If a
state legislature could draw regularly shaped majority-minority
districts that meet the traditional requirements of compactness and
continuity and the preservation of the community's interest, those
districts should not be subject to Constitutional attack. Second, I
71. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74.
72. Id. at 75. HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS (1872). LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 438 (1978). Spencer was a leading
advocate of the theory of Social Darwinism, which influenced the Court's
decisions protecting freedom of contractual rights in the Lochner era. Id.
73. See, e.g., ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS (1978).
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think the Court is saying that the majority-minority districts
drawn with race as a predominant factor can still be justified in
certain cases. The state's interest in remedying past and present
discrimination must be specifically identified; if the legislature
is able to demonstrate that the districts are narrowly tailored to
remedy that discrimination and also to satisfy the standards of
Sections 5 and 2 of the Voting Rights Act. In other words,
majority-minority districts can be drawn if it is necessary to
prevent retrogression or diminish existing levels of minority
voting strength.
Let me spend a couple of moments on Morse v. Republican
Party.74 This is another case brought by white Republicans. It
seems that white Republicans were successful in voting rights
cases in the Supreme Court this past term. This was a very
interesting case because it was similar to Harper v. Board of
Elections7 5 and Terry v. Adams.76 In Harper, the Supreme Court
struck down the Virginia poll tax as violative of the Equal
Protection Clause. In Terry, the Supreme Court struck down the
White Jaybird Primary. The White Jaybird Primary was actually
74. Morse v. Republican Party, 116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996). The Virginia
state party required a S35 to S45 "certification fee" for voters seeking to
become delegates at the nominating convention for candidates running for the
U.S. Senate seat in 1994. Id. at 1191. Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Virginia was prohibited from effecting changes to voter qualification
requirements without preclearance from the Attorney General or a federal
court. Id. at 1193. Finding that these provisions applied to party nominating
conventions, as well as to primaries and general elections, the Court held the
requirement invalid. Id. at 1206.
75. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Virginia
levied a $1.50 annual poll tax on all residents over the age of 21 years.
payment of which was a precondition to voting. Id. at 664 n.l. The Court
struck the state Constitutional provision, holding that it violated the Equal
Protection Clause by conditioning the right to vote on ability to pay. Id. at
666.
76. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). The Jaybird Democratic
Association, limited to white voters, conducted "straw poll" primaries several
months prior to the regular party primaries. Id. at 463-64. The victors of the
Jaybird contest had, in almost every instance for sixty years, become the sole
candidate in the Democratic primary, and therefore the presumptive winner in
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a pre-primary, which excluded black people from an opportunity
to participate. But Morse v. Republican Party reached the
Supreme Court within the context of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, not under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
There were two questions presented in Morse. First, was a
thirty-five or forty-five dollar registration fee to participate in the
statewide Republican convention to nominate Virginia's candidate
for the United States Senate subject to preclearance under Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act?77 Second, was the registration fee
vulnerable to challenge in a private right of action as a poll tax,
which violates Section 10 of the Voting Rights Act. 78
Morse involved the statewide Virginia Republican convention
which ultimately nominated Oliver North79 to be the Republican
candidate running against Chuck Robb 8o for the Virginia seat.
The most interesting aspect of the Morse case was a proven fact
with regard to one of the plaintiffs. The North campaign official
told one of the plaintiffs, who happened to be a University of
Virginia law student, "[l]ook, if you can't afford the $35 and
you're favoring our candidate, if you want to go to the
convention and vote for Oliver North, we'll pay the registration
fee." In the original complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that this was
77. Morse. 116S. Ct. at 1193.
78. Id. The Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1973h (1994), expressly
grants the Attorney General authority to institute actions for enjoining
enforcement of a poll tax. Id.
79. 1994 Senate Races Rundown, THE COOK POLITICAL REPORT, Mar. 7,
1994, at 39. Ret. Marine Lt. Colonel Oliver North gained notoriety for his
involvement in the Iran-contra affair while serving in the Reagan White
House. Id. His felony conviction for violating the Congressional ban on selling
arms to Iran was overturned on appeal. Id. Since leaving the military, North
became active in conservative political causes, including his run for the Senate
in 1994. Id.
80. Charles Robb was first elected to the Senate in 1988 by a commanding
majority (71 %) of the vote, after serving for one term as Governor of
Virginia. Id. His reelection battle, though ultimately successful, was
complicated by charges of involvement with a former Miss Virginia, of
frequenting the local party scene, and of his alleged involvement with the
eavesdropping of Governor Doug Wilder's cellular phone conversations. Id.
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patent vote buying which violated Section 1181 of the Voting
Rights Act. This offer was election fraud, which the Voting
Rights Act was passed to control. But for some reason, ostensibly
legal strategy, the plaintiffs decided to drop that especially
interesting allegation.
Both of the contentions in Morse, whether the registration fee
was subject to preclearance under Section 5 and whether there is
a private right of action to litigate an alleged violation of the anti-
poll tax provisions of Section 10 of the Voting Rights Act,
hinged on whether the white primary cases, Snith v. Alhwright82
and Terry, were still good law. The question presented in the
Supreme Court, which was argued in October of 1995 and
decided in March, is whether these old cases are still good law.
The interesting thing is that the Supreme Court split, five to four,
on whether Smith and Terry are still good law. Five justices said
that they were still good law and four justices said that they were
inapplicable to this particular case. 83
The specific issue was whether the charging of a registration
fee for a state party convention was covered by the preclearance
requirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The question
was whether the statutory language, "state or political
subdivision" encompassed political parties. How is Section 5
applicable to the White Primary Cases? The Court held that the
81. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1974i (c) (1994). This section
provides in pertinent part: "Whoever knowingly or willfuly ... pays or offers
to pay or accepts payment. . for voting shall be fined not more than S10,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." Id.
82. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). The Texas Democratic party
limited its membership, and therefore participation in its primary elections, to
white citizens who were qualified to vote. Id. at 656. The Court found that
primary elections were conducted under statutory authority of the state and as
such were subject to the same discrimination tests as general elections held
directly by the state. Id. at 663. Thus, the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited
abridgement of the right to vote in the primary on account of race. Id. at 666.
83. Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1191. The five justices that adhered to the law
set forth in Smith and Terry were Stevens, who was joined by Ginsburg in
delivering the opinion of the Court, and Breyer, who was joined by 0 'Connor
and Souter in filing the concurring opinion. The dissenting opinions were
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Democratic party holding primary elections and excluding black
voters was state action which was covered by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 84 The issue in
the Morse case was whether the word "state" in the Fourteenth
Amendment meant the same thing as the word "state" in the
Voting Rights Act. Again, the court was split five to four. 85 Five
of the justices of the majority said the word "state" meant the
same thing in the Fourteenth Amendment as it does in the
Voting Rights Act. 86 It was amazing that four justices had the
audacity to say that "state" in the Voting Rights Act has a
narrower meaning than the word "state" in the Fourteenth
Amendment. 87
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach88, the constitutionality of the
Voting Rights Act was challenged, in that the Act's prohibitions
were alleged to be much broader than those in the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. The Voting Rights Act is an amazing
piece of legislation. It requires state and local jurisdictions, nine
states and parts of seven others, prior to implementing a voting
84. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). A Texas statute barred
blacks from participating in the state Democratic primary election. Id. at 540.
Defendants claimed that the statute was not State action in violation of the
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment. Id. In reversing the District Court's
dismissal of the action, the Court found no reason to consider the Fifteenth
Amendment issue because the statute was clearly State action in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 540-41.
85. Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1191. The five justices that agreed that the word
"state" meant the same thing in the Fourteenth Amendment as it did in the
Voting Rights Act were Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, O'Connor and
Souter. The four justices who disagreed with that assertion were Justices
Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy and Rehnquist. Id.
86. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
87. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
88. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). South Carolina
challenged several provisions of the Voting Rights Act as an excessive exercise
of Congressional power in an area traditionally reserved to the states. Id. at
323. Specifically, the Act's remedial application solely to states having a
demonstrable record of discrimination was objected to as violating the
principle of equal treatment. Id. Finding the Act to be a rational means of
enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, the Court dismissed the Article III
complaint. Id. at 337.
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law change, to get the permission of the Justice Department in
Washington or the permission of the U.S. District Court. The
Voting Rights Act suspended literacy tests in all these
jurisdictions and by statute prohibited them, in the absence of
any judicial finding, from using literacy tests at all. The
contention in cases challenging the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act is that it is broader than the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendments. However, four justices of the Supreme Court were
prepared to entertain the notion that it was narrower than the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, at least pertaining to the
definition of "state."
The majority was right in Morse. The decision certainly does
expand the coverage of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. It is
unknown how many jurisdictions or political parties charge a
registration fee to participate in the statewide party nominating
convention, which is actually a substitute for a party primary.
But the practice simply creates a barrier, and these jurisdictions
will have to get permission from the Justice Department. The
Supreme Court gave no indication as to the validity of the
registration fee or whether it was racially discriminatory or not
discriminatory, only that the fee was covered by the Voting
Rights Act and had to be submitted. The most notable part of this
decision is footnote 2789 where Dean Howard Glickstein, 90
testifying before Congress in favor of the extension of the Voting
Rights Act in 1969 on behalf of the United States Commission on
Civil Rights, is quoted extensively in support of the majority
interpretation of the scope of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
89. Morse, 116 S. Ct. at 1203 n.27. Howard A. Glickstein. Director of
the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, detailed the efforts political parties
undertook in several states to discriminate against African-Americans through
the use of party rules rather than official state action. Id. These tactics included
exclusion of minority representation at conventions, withholding meeting
information from minority members, increasing the filing fee for candidates.
and misleading minority candidates about primary election requirements. Id.
90. Before joining the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, Howard A.
Glickstein served as a Staff Attorney with the Department of Justice. He has
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Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
Let us proceed to another topic which has some relationship in
certain respects to Equal Protection. To discuss this topic and the
relevant cases, we have Touro's Vice-Dean. who has over the
years become a recognized authority in the area of
discrimination. Of course, I am referring to Professor Eileen
Kaufman. 1 Not only has she become an authority at the law
school and indeed at these conferences, but she is the original
drafter of the sections of New York Pattern Jury Instructions, the
model jury instructions that New York judges use in the course of
trying discrimination cases. It is now my pleasure to introduce
Professor Eileen Kaufman.
Professor Eileen Kaufman:
Thank you. Leon always asks me to speak late in the day, but
the quid pro quo is that he gives me the best cases to talk about.
The Equal Protection2 cases that I will be describing represent
either the finest or the worst moments of the term, depending on
your point of view.
1. Vice Dean and Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg
Law Center. B.A., Skidmore College, 1970; J.D.. New York University,
1975: L.L.M., New York University, 1992. In addition to serving as Vice
Dean and Professor of Law at Touro Law Center, Dean Kaufman has been a
Managing Attorney at Westchester Legal Services, Inc. and serves on the New
York State Bar Association President's Committee on Access to Justice, and is
Reporter for the New York Pattern Jury Instructions. She has published
primarily in the area of civil rights law.
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This amendment provides in
pertinent part: "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
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Last term, the Supreme Court decided three important
discrimination cases: one involving age discrimination in the
workplace, 3 one involving discrimination against gays and
lesbians in the political process4 and one involving sex
discrimination in higher education. 5 Not surprisingly, Justice
Scalia figured prominently in all three cases. 6 I will discuss
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,7 the statutory
age discrimination case, rather quickly so that we can focus on
the two highly controversial equal protection cases of the term,
Romer v. Evans8 and United States v. Virginia.9
The first of these important discrimination cases was O'Connor
v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. This case arose under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 196710 [hereinafter
"ADEA"]. 11 The issue in O'Connor was whether a plaintiff, in
3. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307
(1996).
4. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
5. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). See also Eric J.
Stockel, United States v. Virginia: Does Intermediate Scrutiny Still Exist?, 13
TOURO L. REv. 229 (1996).
6. Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion in O'Connor and wrote
particularly ascerbic dissents in Romer and Virginia, the two equal protection
cases.
7. 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996).
8. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
9. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1985). Section 623(a) states:
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in a way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's age.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
11. Petitioner was employed by respondent for twelve years before he was
fired. O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1309. He claimed that he was discharged in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 that prohibits
the denial of employment opportunities on the basis of age. Id. Petitioner, age
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an age discrimination suit, must demonstrate that he or she was
replaced by someone outside of the protected age category in
order to make out a prima facie case under the McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green12 framework. 13
In McDonnell Douglas v. Green, a Title VII case, the Supreme
Court developed a formula that allocates the burdens and order of
presentation of proof in discrimination cases based on
circumstantial evidence. 14 Under this formula, a plaintiff must
establish the following four elements to make out a prima facie
case of discrimination: 1) that plaintiff is a member of a protected
group defined by the statute; 2) that plaintiff applied for and was
56 at the time of his discharge, could not prove that his replacement was a
member of a class not protected by the statute. Id. at 1310. The Court held that
the fact that Petitioner was replaced by someone within the protected class is
"irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his age.... because the
ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age and not class membership."
Id.
12. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Respondent was employed by petitioner as a
mechanic for eight years before he was laid off. Id. at 794. Respondent
maintained that his discharge was a result of respondent's racially motivated
hiring practices and was, therefore, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Id. See generally, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993). Title VII was enacted in response to the nationwide persistence of
discrimination against minority groups to eliminate the unfairness and
humiliation of discrimination. See, e.g., David Benjamin Oppenheimer.
Kennedy, King, Shuttlesivorth and Walker: The Events Leading to the
Inroduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 671
(1995). In McDonnell Douglas, respondent was an active participant in a
variety of protests at petitioner's manufacturing plant. McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 794-95. The Court found that, while petitioner was able to justify
its reasons for discharging the respondent, the respondent must be afforded an
opportunity to refute petitioner's reason for his discharge as a mere pretext. Id.
at 804. The case was remanded to the District Court because respondent was
not given a "full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence
that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a cover-up
for a racially discriminatory decision." Id. at 805.
13. O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1309. While the McDonnell Douglas
framework has traditionally been applied to plaintiffs bringing Title VII
discrimination actions, it has also been applied to ADEA cases. Id. at 1310.
Therefore, in order to make out a claim under the ADEA, petitioner must
make a prima facie showing under this framework. Id.
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qualified for a position for which the employer was seeking
applicants; 3) that plaintiff did not receive the position; and 4)
that after the rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to interview applicants possessing plaintiff's
qualifications. 15  These four elements must be adapted for
discharge or promotion cases. Once the plaintiff makes this
initial four part showing, the burden of production shifts to the
employer to articulate a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the employer's rejection."' 16  After the employer attempts to
explain its reasons for the discharge, the plaintiff has the
opportunity to establish that the employer's proffered reason was
merely a pretext for discrimination. 17
In O'Connor, plaintiff, age 56, claimed that he was discharged
because of his age in violation of the ADEA. 18 He had no
difficulty establishing the first three McDonnell Douglas
elements. 19 Clearly, he was a member of the age group
protected by the ADEA, he was discharged, and at the time of
his discharge he was performing his job at a level that met his
employer's expectations. 20 However, he was unable to meet the
burden of proving the fourth element because his replacement
was also within the protected age group proscribed by the
ADEA. 2 1 Thus, the issue became whether a prima facie claim of
discrimination requires that the replacement be outside the
protected class. 22 The Court concluded that it does not. 23
15. Id. at 802.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 804.
18. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.. 116 S. Ct. 1307,
1309 (1996).
19. Id.
20. Id. The ADEA protects all persons who are at least 40 years of age.
See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1985 & Supp. 1996). Petitioner, at the time of his
discharge, was 56 years old, and well within the protected class enumerated in
the statute. O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1309.
21. Id. Plaintiff's replacement was 40 years old. Id.
22. Id. at 1310.
23. Id. The Court noted that "the fact that an ADEA plaintiff was replaced
by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case." Id.
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According to the Court, in order to determine whether an
inference of discrimination exists, the proper inquiry should be
whether the plaintiff was replaced by someone substantially
younger, not whether plaintiff was replaced by someone outside
the protected group. 24 The Court reasoned that "the fact that one
person in the protected class has lost out to another person in the
protected class is thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost out
because of his age."25
An important question that arises from O'Connor is whether or
not this principle will be applied to other discrimination statutes,
particularly race or sex discrimination claims arising under Title
VI.26 The central rationale of O'Connor seems to be equally
applicable to cases involving race or gender discrimination
although there is already disagreement in the circuits about the
applicability of O'Connor to Title VII. For example, in Carson
v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation,27 a case involving race
discrimination under Title VII, 28 the Seventh Circuit held that
O'Connor applies and that a Title VII plaintiff need not allege
that the replacement was outside the protected class.2 9 The Court
reasoned that:
24. Id. The Court illustrated this distinction by comparing a 40 year old
who is replaced by a 39 year old to a situation where a 56 year old is replaced
by a 40 year old worker. Id. In the former circumstance, the replacement is
outside the protected class but a one year age difference would hardly support
an inference of age discrimination. Id. Whereas, in the latter situation, a 16
year age difference may signify age discrimination even though both
individuals are within the protected class. Id.
25. Id.
26. Title VII is aimed at eliminating employment discrimination "against
any individual with respect to his compensation, term, conditions, or
privileges in employment, because of the individual's race, sex, color.
religion, and national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988 & Supp. V
1996)
27. 82 F.3d 157 (7th Cir. 1996).
28. Plaintiff, a white female, brought suit against her former employee
claiming that her discharge was in violation of Title VII. Id. at 158.
29. Id. at 158. The court noted that the relevant inquiry was "whether the
employee would have taken the same action had the employee been of a
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[a]n employee may be able to show that his race or another
characteristic that the law places off limits tipped the scales
against him, without regard to the demographic characteristics of
his replacement. . . .That one's replacement is of another race,
sex or age may help to raise an inference of discrimination, but
it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition. 30
However, the Sixth Circuit, in dicta, has indicated that the
O'Connor reasoning does not apply with equal force to sex
discrimination cases. 3 1 Ultimately, the Supreme Court is likely
to decide the scope and reach of the O'Connor holding.
The two Equal Protection discrimination cases decided last
term are among the most symbolically and practically significant
decisions of the Court in recent years. The first case, Romer v.
Evans,32 involved a challenge to Amendment 2 of the Colorado
State Constitution, which prohibited the State of Colorado and its
political subdivisions from enacting any statute, regulation,
ordinance or policy designed to protect homosexual persons from
30. Id. at 158-59. The Seventh Circuit hypothesized an employer who
retains black workers only in the top quarter of its labor force on a yearly basis
but keeps white employees at the top half. This employer is engaging in racial
discrimination which is not purged if, thereafter, the employer has another
black employee. Id.
31. See Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that, even
though the plaintiff mat the four element test of McDonnell Douglas, the
defendant was able to prove that their decision not to promote plaintiff was not
based on sex, but rather that plaintiff lacked necessary computer skills), cert.
denied. 117 S. Ct. 683 (1997).
32. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). Respondents challenged the constitutionality
of the State of Colorado's Amendment 2 on the grounds that it violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1623. The
effect of Amendment 2 was to prohibit any governmental entity from adopting
any statute, ordinance, rule or policy that barred discrimination based sexual
preferences. Id. at 1624. Respondents alleged that Amendment 2 would
"subject them to immediate and substantial risk of discrimination on the basis
of their sexual orientation." Id. Petitioners maintained that Amendment 2
only denies homosexuals preferential treatment. Id. The majority of the Court
ruled that Amendment 2 puts homosexuals in a "solitary class ... [and]
withdraws from [them], but no others, specific legal protection from the
injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws
and policies." Id. at 1625.
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discrimination. 33 The Amendment withdrew from gays and
lesbians "specific legal protection from the injuries caused by
[private and governmental] discrimination. "34  Further,
Amendment 2 forbade such anti-discrimination laws, which had
already been enacted in Denver, Aspen and Boulder, to be
reinstated. 35  Thus, while the proponents of Amendment 2
linguistically described the amendment as denying special rights,
Amendment 2 did just the opposite; it imposed a special disability
on this group alone because no other group must amend the State
constitution in order to obtain protection against discrimination. 36
In a 6-3 decision, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
subjected the legislation to rational basis review, 37 the lowest
level of judicial scrutiny afforded to equal protection claims. 38
Under the rational basis test, a classification is upheld so long as
it bears a rational relation to a legitimate end. 39 Thus, even a
law that "seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a
particular group" or is supported by only a tenuous rationale,
will, nevertheless, survive constitutional challenge. 40
However, Colorado's Amendment 2 could not pass even this
most deferential level of scrutiny. 4 1 The Court could not find a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the classification and
noted that this type of broad "disqualification of a class of
persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is
33. Id. at 1623.
34. Id. at 1625.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1626-27.
37. Id. at 1627.
38. See e.g., Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct 2637 (1993) (holding that a state
statute that draws classifications involving the mentally retarded and mentally
ill are upheld if there is a rational basis between the classification drawn and a
legitimate governmental purpose).
39. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
40. Id. The Court stated that "[b]y requiring that a classification bear a
rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end, we
ensure that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the
group burdened by the law." Id.
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unprecedented in our jurisprudence." 42  The disadvantage
imposed on the group was not a by-product of the classification,
it was itself the purpose of the classification. 4 3  The Court
concluded that "the inevitable inference raised by Amendment 2
is that the disadvantage imposed was born of animosity toward
the class of persons affected."' 44  Justice Kennedy strongly
reminded us that, "[i]f the constitutional concept of 'equal
protection' of the laws means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest." 4 5
The majority opinion is as interesting for what it does not say
as for what it does say. First, the Court makes no mention of the
political process cases, such as Hunter v. Erickson,4 6 even though
that was the basis for the Colorado Supreme Court decision. 47
The Colorado Supreme Court had held that Amendment 2
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. "Amendment 2... make[s] a general announcement that gays and
lesbians shall not have any particular protections from the law, inflicts on them
immediate, continuing and real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate
justifications that may be claimed for it." Id. at 1628-29.
45. Id. at 1628 (quoting Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973)(emphasis omitted)).
46. 393 U.S. 385 (1969). After the City Council of Akron, Ohio adopted
a fair housing ordinance, voters amended the city charter to prohibit any
ordinance regulating "the use, sale advertisement, transfer ... of real
property ... on the basis of race, color, religion or ancestry." Id. at 387. The
Court held that a State may not "disadvantage any particular group by making
it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any
person's vote or give any group a smaller representation than another of
comparable size." Id. at 393. Since this was exactly what the City of Akron
intended to do. the ordinance violated the equal protection clause and
constituted "a real, substantial, and invidious denial of equal protection of the
laws." Id.
47. Romer, 116 S. Ct 1624. The Colorado Supreme Court found that
"Amendment 2 was to be subject to strict scrutiny because it infringed the
fundamental right of gays and lesbians to participate in the political process."
Id. The Colorado court relied on previous United States Supreme Court
decisions in both voting rights cases and cases involving discriminatory
restructuring of governmental decision making. Id. See Evans v. Romer, 882
P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994).
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violated the fundamental right of equal participation in the
political process. 48  Second, the majority opinion neither
mentions nor cites Bowers v. Hardwick,49 the 1986 decision
upholding Georgia's consensual sodomy statute. More about that
in a moment. Third, the Court failed to decide whether
heightened scrutiny should be applied in Equal Protection
challenges based on sexual orientation. Instead, the Court's
opinion reflects the approaches advocated in two amicus briefs,
one submitted by five constitutional law professors including
Lawrence H. Tribe of Harvard Lav School50 and the other by
the Human Rights Campaign Fund.5 1 The brief filed by the
48. Romer, 116 S. Ct 1624.
49. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Respondent was charged with committing
sodomy with another adult male in the privacy of his home in violation of a
Georgia statute forbidding sodomy by any person. Id. at 187-88. Hardwick
brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the Georgia statute. Id. at 188.
Hardwick challenged the statute on the basis of substantive due process and the
Court framed the issue as whether he had a fundamental right to engage m
homosexual sodomy. Id. at 191. The Court held that fundamental liberties are
either "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" or "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 194. As such, the Court concluded that
homosexual sodomy was not such a liberty under the aforementioned criteria
and therefore, the Court upheld the statute against Respondent's substantive
due process attack. Id. at 196.
50. See Amicus Brief of Lawrence H. Tribe, John Hartley. Gerald
Gunther. Phillip B. Kurland and Kathleen M. Sullivan in Support of
Respondents, 1995 WL 862021 (No. 94-1039).
5 1. See Amicus Brief of the Human Rights Campaign Fund. et al.. in
Support of Respondents, 1995 WL 782809 (No. 94-1039). Amici consisted of
a variety of organizations including:
several national organizations dedicated to the protection of civil rights.
including the Human Rights Campaign Fund, the National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force, the National Lesbian and Gay Law Association,
the National Center for Lesbian Rights, the Gay and Lesbian Medical
Association, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the
National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium, the National
Organization for Women and the NOW Legal Defense and Education
Fund.
Amici also include state organizations concerned about discrimination,
including the Connecticut Women's Education and Legal Fund, Inc..
the Gay and Lesbian Law Association of Florida, the Oregon Gay and




Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1997
TOURO LAW REVIEW
constitutional law professors argued that Amendment 2 was the
rare example of a literal deprivation of equal protection because
only gays and lesbians were ineligible for state law protection
against discrimination. 52 The brief submitted by the Human
Rights Campaign Fund argued that given the state's justifications
for Amendment 2, which included the protection of the freedom
of association of landlords and employers and the need to
conserve law enforcement resources, the amendment could not
withstand rational basis review because the amendment was so
tremendously over and under inclusive with respect to those
objectives. The majority opinion incorporates both theories
enumerated in the amicus briefs and, despite its failure to tackle
some of the obvious questions prompted by this Amendment, it
does establish the principle that governmental discrimination
against gays and lesbians will not be upheld when supported only
by an animus directed against this particular group. 53
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, wrote a particularly scathing dissenting opinion. 54 In
the very first sentence, Justice Scalia writes "[t]he Court has
mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite." 55 Kulturkampf refers
to the conflict between the German imperial government and the
Roman Catholic Church in the late 19th century, chiefly over the
control of educational and ecclesiastical appointments. 5 6 In other
words, a kulturkampf is a culture struggle and Justice Scalia
makes clear which side of this culture war he supports.
According to Justice Scalia, Amendment 2 is the result of a
cultural debate over whether opposition to homosexuality is as
Lawyers for Human Rights - the Lesbian and Gay Bar Association of
Los Angeles, Orange County Lawyers for Equality Gay and Lesbian,
and the Tom Homann Bar Association of San Diego.
Id. at *1.
52. Amicus Brief of Lawrence H. Tribe, et al., 1995 WL 862021, *3 (No.
94-1039).
53. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct 1620, 1627 (1996).
54. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting)
56. Kulturkampf is defined as a "conflict between civil government and
religious authorities esp[ecially] over control of education and church
appointments." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 667 (1989).
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reprehensible as racial or religious bias. 57 To Justice Scalia,
there is nothing objectionable about a "modest attempt by
seemingly tolerant Coloradoans to preserve traditional sexual
mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to
revise those mores through use of the laws." 58
Moreover, Justice Scalia found the majority's reasoning to be
inconsistent with Bowers. He maintained that if Bowers
permitted a State to make homosexual conduct illegal, then it
must surely be "constitutionally permissible for a State to enact
other laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct." 59
Anticipating the argument that Amendment 2 reaches status and
not conduct, Justice Scalia asserted that it is surely "rational to
deny special favor, and protection to those with a self-avowed
tendency or desire to engage in the conduct." 60 One of the
mistakes that Justice Scalia makes in his analysis is that
homosexual sodomy is not synonymous with homosexual
conduct.
The intriguing question that arises after Romer is to what
extent, if at all, Romer undercuts the continued vitality of
Bowers. As an aside, we should note that after Justice Powell
retired, he admitted that he probably made a mistake in joining
the 5-4 majority in Bowers. 61 On the surface, one can easily
reconcile the two cases by pointing out that Romer is an Equal
Protection case whereas Bowers was a substantive due process
case. Second, the Court is unquestionably averse to expanding
substantive due process. Third, it is not necessarily inconsistent
to permit a state to prohibit a particular activity while not
permitting the state to immunize open-ended discrimination
against an entire class of persons, some of whom might engage in
57. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia. J.. dissenting).
58. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting)
59. Id. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
60. Id. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIs F. POWELL. JR.: A
BIOGRAPHY 530 (1994) ("On October 18, 1994, Powell gave the annual James
Madison lecture at New York University Law School and afterward answered
students' questions... . 'I think I probably made a mistake on that one,*
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that activity. 62 At the very least, Romer symbolically marks the
beginning of a new era in which the Court, for the very first
time, has recognized and sustained an equal protection claim
advanced by gays and lesbians. 63
The other equally controversial Equal Protection case of the
term was United States v. Virginia,64 where the Court found that
Virginia's policy of excluding women from the Virginia Military
Institute [hereinafter "VMI"] violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 65 VMI, as we all know, is an unusual and indeed a
unique institution. Its self-described mission is to produce
"citizen-soldiers" defined as men prepared for leadership in
either military service or civilian life. 66 VMI has been quite
successful in fulfilling this mission as its graduates include
military generals, Congressmen, and captains of industry. 67 The
manner in which VMI prepares its students to be citizen-soldiers
is through a model of education featuring "physical rigor, mental
stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute
regulation of behavior and indoctrination in desirable values." 6 8
62. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1622. Kathleen Sullivan, counsel for Amici
Curiae, argued that even if a State made gambling illegal, it would not follow
that the same State may authorize unlimited discrimination against gamblers as
a class. Amicus Brief of Lawrence H. Tribe. et al., 1995 WL 862021, *10
(No. 94-1039). Furthermore, when the State permits inequality under the law,
it "renders a person ineligible for the protection from an entire category of
wrongful conduct that might otherwise be available through the state's system
for making and enforcing laws." Id.
63. Romer, 116 S. Ct 1629.
64. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
65. Id. at 2287 ("The State [of Virginia] has shown no 'exceedingly
persuasive justification' for withholding from women qualified for the
experience premier training of the kind VMI affords.").
66. Id. at 2269. VMI's mission statement aims "to produce educated and
honorable men, prepared for the varied work of civil life, imbued with love of
learning, confident in the functions and attitudes of leadership, possessing a
high sense of public service ... and ready as citizen-soldiers to defend their
country in time of national peril." Id. at 2270 (quoting Mission Study
Committee of the VMI Board of Visitors, Report, May 16, 1986).
67. Id. VMI's reputation as an exceptionally challenging military
undergraduate school and its wide base of alumni contacts attracts men
dedicated to becoming citizen-soldiers. Id. at 2270-71.
68. Id. at 2270.
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All sides in the dispute agreed that this model of education was
unique to VMI and unavailable to women.69
Despite that fact, the district court ruled in favor of VMI,
finding that single sex education yields substantial benefits, which
would be lost if women were permitted to enroll. 70 Moreover,
the district court found that single-sex education brings diversity
to an otherwise coeducational school system.71  The Fourth
Circuit reversed, finding that Virginia had failed to rationalize its
determination to achieve diversity by offering VMI's unique type
of program to men but not to women. 72 The court concluded
that "a policy of diversity which aims to provide an array of
educational opportunities, including single-gender institutions,
must do more than favor one gender." 73
The Fourth Circuit offered the following three remedial options
to VMI: (1) admit women to VMI; (2) establish a parallel
program; or (3) give up financial support from the State. 74
Virginia responded by proposing a plan to establish an all-female,
publicly-funded military college that would provide a single-sex
education similar to that of VMI.75 The Virginia Woman's
Institute for Leadership [hereinafter "VWIL"] would be located
at Mary Baldwin College, a private liberal arts college, and
would be supported with funding equal to the support provided
for VMI cadets. Both the District Court and a divided Fourth
Circuit approved this remedial plan by using a "substantive
69. "VMI pursues this mission through pervasive training of a kind not
available anywhere else in Virginia." Id. at 2269.
70. 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1411 (W.D.Va. 1991).
71. Id. at 1413.
72. 976 F.2d 890, 892 (4th Cir. 1992).
73. Id. at 899. The court went further and stated that "if responsibility for
implementing diversity has somehow been delegated to an individual
institution, no explanation is apparent as to how one institution with
autonomy, but with no authority over any other state institution, can give
effect to a state policy of diversity among institutions." Id.
74. Id. at 900.
75. The plan called for the establishment of the Virginia Woman's Institute
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comparability" test, roughly equivalent to a "separate but equal"
approach. 7 6
Two issues were presented for Supreme Court review: first, did
Virginia's exclusion of women from VMI constitute unlawful
gender discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause; and
second, presuming that the exclusion violated the Equal
Protection Clause, what is the appropriate remedy for that
constitutional violation. 77
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg must have derived
tremendous satisfaction. 78 After all, she led the fight in the
1970's to establish the Equal Protection Clause as a weapon to
combat sex discrimination. 79 It was not until 1971, in Reed v.
Reed,80 that the Equal Protection Clause was used to strike down
76. See generally, United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D.Va.
1994); United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995). The Fourth
Circuit determined that, in order for Virginia to satisfy the "substantive
comparability" test, the court had to determine:
(1) whether the state's objective of providing single-gender education to
its citizens may be considered a legitimate and important governmental
objective; (2) whether the gender classification adopted is directly and
substantially related to that purpose; and (3) whether the resulting
mutual exclusion of women and men from each other's institutions
leaves open opportunities for those excluded to obtain substantively
comparable benefits at their institution or through other means offered
by the state."
Id. at 1237.
77. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996).
78. The majority opinion was written by Justice Ginsburg and was joined
by Justices Stevens, O'Connor. Kennedy, Souter and Breyer. Chief Justice
Rehnquist concurred separately and Justice Scalia dissented. Justice Thomas
did not participate because his son attends VMI.
79. See Deborah L. Marcowitz, In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman's
Work To Change The Law, 14 WOMAN'S RTs. L. REP. 335 (1992). Justice
Ginsburg became active with women's rights in the 1960's while she was a
professor at Rutgers University School of Law. Id at 337. Shortly after acting
as a volunteer attorney for the New Jersey affiliate of the ACLU, she joined
Melvin L. Wulf, Legal Director of the ACLU, in drafting the ACLU's amicus
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a state statute that discriminated against women. 8 1  Justice
Ginsburg painstakingly detailed the history of romantic
paternalism that was the hallmark of the judicial response to
claims of gender discrimination in an effort to remind the reader
why the Court applies heightened scrutiny when reviewing
gender classifications. 82 Interestingly, despite the fact that mid-
level scrutiny has come to be recognized as the appropriate test to
evaluate gender claims, Drew S. Days, Jr., on behalf of the
Clinton administration, argued that the Court should adopt strict
scrutiny in this case. 83
While not adopting strict scrutiny, the Court did apply a
particularly rigorous mid-level or intermediate scrutiny test. 84
Mid-level scrutiny generally requires that the classification be
based upon an important governmental objective and that the
means employed by the state be substantially related to achieving
that objective. 85 Since the adoption of mid-level scrutiny in
1976,86 we have seen at least a few variations on how that test is
employed. For example, in the hands of Justice Rehnquist, mid-
level scrutiny is hard to distinguish from rational basis review,
most notably in Matter of Michael M. v. Superior Court,87 the
statutory rape case.
81. Id. at 73. In Reed, the Court held that a mandatory provision of an
Idaho statute, which gave preference to men over women for appointments as
administrators of estates, was an unconstitutional gender classification. Id at
77. The Court rejected the State's argument that administrative convenience
sufficed to justify the disparate treatment under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 76.
82. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274-75. Heightened scrutiny places a burden
on the State to show that the classification serves "important governmental
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related
to the achievement of those objectives." Id. at 2275.
83. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 18, United States v. Virginia, 116
S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (No. 94-1941).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In Craig. a majority of the
Court adopted an intermediate standard of judicial scrutiny for discrimination
based upon gender. Id. at 197.
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However, in United States v. Virginia, Justice Ginsburg
refereed to mid-level scrutiny as "skeptical scrutiny," 88 requiring
a searching review, whereby the Court determines whether the
government has satisfied the demanding burden of establishing an
exceedingly persuasive justification. 89 This exceedingly
persuasive justification must be "genuine, not hypothesized or
invented post hoc in response to litigation. . . and it must not
rely on over-broad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females." 90
Applying this standard to VMI's exclusion of women, Justice
Ginsburg rejected Virginia's claim that the exclusion of women
furthered the state's interest in achieving diversity in education. 9 1
Because mid-level scrutiny requires that the classification be
evaluated in reference to its actual objectives, and not after the
fact justifications, the majority concluded that the history of
excluding women from VMI was unrelated to achieving
educational diversity. 92 In other words, the Court decided that
achieving diversity among institutions was not the actual reason
for the challenged admissions policy. 93
The majority had little trouble rejecting Virginia's claims that:
(1) the program at VMI could not be adapted for women; (2) that
the admission of women would downgrade VMI's stature; and
(3) that women would not be interested in enrolling at VMI. 94
While conceding that most women would not choose to attend
VMI, the majority also noted that most men would choose not to
enroll. 95 However, that was not the issue in this case. The issue
was "whether the State can constitutionally deny to women who
88. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274.
89. Id. at 2275.
90. Id. at 2274-75.
91. Id. at 2279.
92. Id. at 2277. The Court cautioned that "benign justifications proffered
in defense of categorical exclusions will not be accepted automatically: a
tenable justification must describe actual State purposes, not rationalizations
for actions in fact differently grounded." Id.
93. Id. at 2279.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2280.
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have the will and capacity, the training and attendant
opportunities that VMI uniquely affords." 9 6
In response to the concern that the admission of women would
tarnish the reputation of VMI. if not completely destroy the
institution, Justice Ginsburg documented the fact that, over the
ages, this fear has been used to deny rights and opportunities to
women. 97 She cited a 1925 report from Columbia Law School
which stated:
the faculty ... never maintained that women could not master
legal learning ... No, its argument has been ... more
practical. If women were admitted to the Columbia Law School,
[the faculty] said, then the choicer, more manly and red-blooded
graduates of our great universities would go to the Harvard Law
School!98
The majority concluded that VMI's goal of producing citizen
soldiers would not be compromised by the admission of women
"who today count as citizens in our American democracy equal in
stature to men." 99
Having found that the admissions policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court had to determine an appropriate
remedy. The Court noted that a proper remedy must "eliminate
to the extent possible the discriminatory effects of the past and
bar like discrimination in the future. "100
The Court found Virginia's remedial plan, which consisted of
establishing VWIL at Mary Baldwin College, to be woefully
inadequate.101 The Court found that, although described as a
parallel program, VWIL did not provide a rigorous military
training, the very hallmark of VMI. 102 Instead. VWIL de-
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2281 ("The notion that admission of women would downgrade
VMI's stature, destroy the adversative system and, with it, even the school, is
a judgment hardly proved, a prediction hardly different from other 'self-
fulfilling prophecies.'").
98. Id. (quoting The Nation, Feb. 18, 1925, at 173).
99. Id. at 2282.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2284.
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emphasized military training in favor of a cooperative method of
education designed to reinforce self-esteem. 103
Furthermore, VWIL students do not wear uniforms, they do
not live together throughout the four year program and they do
not eat meals together. 104 In short, none of the VMI barracks
style living, "designed to foster an egalitarian ethic" and deemed
so essential to that experience, exist at VWIL. 105 Thus, in many
ways, the VWIL program proved dramatically inferior: the
students were less qualified; the faculty was less impressive and
not paid as well; the course offerings were far more limited; and
the facilities were far less extensive. 106
While acknowledging the pragmatic differences between the
programs, Virginia maintained that they were justified
pedagogically based on the important differences between how
men and women learn. 10 7 However, the Court stated that this is
just the type of stereotypical thinking and over-broad
generalization that proves fatal when evaluating gender
discrimination claims. 10 8 According to the Court, Virginia could
not demonstrate the substantial equality between the two
programs, and as such, the remedy failed to match the severity of
the constitutional violation and was deemed inadequate. 109
Justice Scalia wrote another scathing dissent, criticizing the
majority for applying what, to him, seems to be a beefed up mid-
level scrutiny test. 110 He also condemned the Court for implying
that it has not ruled out the use of strict scrutiny to resolve gender
cases. I Justice Scalia accused the majority of playing Supreme




106. Id. at 2287.
107. Id. at 2283.
108. Id. at 2284.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Intermediate scrutiny has never
acquired a least-restrictive-means analysis, but only a 'substantial relation'
between the classification and the State interests that it serves.").
111. Id. at 2292 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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calculated to destabilize the law. 112  Even Chief Justice
Rehnquist fails to escape Justice Scalia's pen. Although finding
Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion more moderate than the
majority's, Justice Scalia believes that was at the expense of
being even more implausible. 113
What is the status of government supported single-sex
institutions, given the VMI decision? In Mississippi University
for Women v. Hogan,114 the 1982 nursing school case, the Court
declined to decide the question of whether states can provide
separate but equal undergraduate institutions for males and
females. 115 In United States v. Virginia, the Court pointedly
stated that it was addressing only the constitutionality of an
educational opportunity recognized as being unique and available
only at the State's sole single-sex university. 116 However, in a
footnote, the majority acknowledged they "do not question the
112. Id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that both the
State and Federal Government are entitled to know what standard of judicial
scrutiny they will be held to before they act. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 2303 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia found that Chief
Justice Rehnquist's approach was even more implausible than the majority's
approach because of his dismissal of Virginia's justifications for a single-sex
admission policy. Id. at 2304 (Scalia, J., dissenting). To Justice Scalia, one
question was left unanswered under Justice Rehnquist's rationale: "[f
Virginia cannot get credit for assisting women's education if it only treats
women's private schools ... then why should it get [the] blame for assisting
men's education if it only treats VMI as it does all other public schools? This
is a great puzzlement." Id. at 2305 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. 458 U.S. 718 (1982). In Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan. the
State of Mississippi sought to uphold the female-only admissions policy at the
Mississippi University for Women School of Nursing on the grounds that the
admissions policy was designed to compensate for past discrimination against
women, and therefore, constituted educational affirmative action. Id. at 727.
The lawsuit was brought by Joe Hogan, a male who had sought admission to
the baccalaureate program at the nursing school. Id. at 720. He was denied
admission solely on the basis of his sex, even though his qualifications equaled
those of the admitted women. Id. at 720-21. The Hogan Court, applying
intermediate scrutiny, struck down the statute, finding the exclusion did not
serve the compensatory purpose proffered by the State. Id. at 730.
115. Id. at 721 n.1.
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State's prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse educational
opportunities. " 117
In my opinion, this statement means that the court would
uphold single-sex schools so long as they were justified
pedagogically, and so long as substantial equality between the
schools was established. However, what is less clear is whether
substantial equality will, in every case, require programmatic
equivalence.
As a final note, I should add that we may be entering a new era
of Equal Protection analysis, whereby the choice of what
standard of review governs may be less outcome-determinative
than in the past. Two terms ago, in Adarand Construction v.
Pena, 118 an affirmative action case, the Court explicitly rejected
the maxim that "strict scrutiny was strict in theory but fatal in
fact." 119 Moreover, the Court's use of rational basis in Romer v.
Evans may signify a toothier test than the "any conceivable
basis" version lately in vogue.
While the outcome of cases using mid-level scrutiny has always
been difficult to predict, it may be that, if the Court continues to
use the version of mid-level scrutiny employed by the majority in
VMI. the test may more closely resemble strict scrutiny than it
has in the past. 120
Perhaps the Court is unwittingly and unself-consciously edging
toward what Justice Marshall unsuccessfully advocated more than
twenty years ago, a sliding scale of judicial review dependent on
117. Id.
118. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
119. Id. at 2275 n.6.
120. It must be noted that the Supreme Court has, on two occasions,
seemingly left open the possibility that strict scrutiny may be adopted for
review of gender classifications in the future. See Stockel, supra note 5, at
237, n.55 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
n.9 (1982) ("Because we conclude that the challenged statutory classification is
not substantially related to an important objective, we need not decide whether
classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect."); J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 n.6 (1994) ("Because we conclude that
gender-based peremptory challenges are not substantially related to an
important government objective, we once again need not decide whether
classifications based on gender are inherently suspect.")).
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the strength of the interest asserted and the invidiousness of the
classification itself. 12 1 The Court's recent Equal Protection cases
may not signal a major sea of change in Equal Protection analysis
but they do signify some shifting of the sands.
121. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. 97-110
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